IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI WESTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)	
Plaintiff,)	
v.)	No. 09-00157-02-CR-W-SOW
JULIE ANN WEBER HANKINS TORNEDEN,)	
Defendant.)	

PLEA AGREEMENT

Pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the parties described below have entered into the following plea agreement:

1. The Parties. The parties to this agreement are the United States Attorney's Office for the Western District of Missouri (otherwise referred to as "the Government" or "the United States"), represented by Matt J. Whitworth, United States Attorney, and Bruce Rhoades, Assistant United States Attorney, and the defendant, Julie Ann Weber Hankins Torneden ("the defendant"), represented by Tricia A. Tenpenny.

The defendant understands and agrees that this plea agreement is only between her and the United States Attorney for the Western District of Missouri, and that it does not bind any other federal, state, or local prosecution authority or any other government agency, unless otherwise specified in this agreement.

- 2. <u>Defendant's Guilty Plea</u>. The defendant agrees to and hereby does plead guilty to Count Two of the indictment charging her with a violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(c)(1) and (2) and 846, that is conspiracy to possess a listed chemical, pseudoephedrine, knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe that it would be used to manufacture a controlled substance. By entering into this plea agreement, the defendant admits that she knowingly committed these offenses, and is in fact guilty of these offenses.
- **3.** <u>Factual Basis for Guilty Plea</u>. The parties agree that the evidence the Government would admit at trial to prove the offense to which the defendant is pleading guilty is as follows:

On February 4, 2007, an armed robbery occurred at the Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC pharmaceutical manufacturing facility in Kansas City, Missouri. During the robbery, a security guard was taken hostage and one 50-kilogram drum of pharmaceutical pseudoephedrine powder was stolen.

The manner in which the crimes at the Sanofi-Aventis campus were executed, raised suspicions that the crimes were committed by someone with knowledge of the inside layout of the facility and outside operation of the facility. Based on that, contractors were examined. One of those was waste disposal contractor Heritage Environmental, based in Kansas City, MO. This business was hired to dispose of hazardous and pseudoephedrine waste materials from Sanofi-Aventis.

Waste is created in a variety of ways and includes left over material from the manufacturing process, contaminated material and expired material. The manufacturing process creates approximately 2% pseudoephedrine waste. This waste is still considered pharmaceutical grade pseudoephedrine on the streets. Co-defendant Garland Duane Hankins worked for Heritage Environmental for approximately 12 years and part of his duties was disposal of pseudoephedrine waste from Sanofi-Aventis.

¹All the pseudoephedrine seized never tested below 85% pure. While there is "only" a 92% conversion from pseudoephedrine to methamphetamine, that doesn't cause the purity rate of the methamphetamine to drop significantly. Therefore, "pure pseudo" creates "pure meth."

²It should be noted that throughout this investigation, multiple people identified the pseudoephedrine they sold or bought or used to manufacture methamphetamine as coming from the "trash" or as "waste" or from someone who "got rid of it" for a plant.

In May of 2007, co-defendant Mindy Morris identified co-defendant Harley Harvey as a source of pseudoephedrine or "E", meaning ephedrine.³ Harvey had made admissions to Morris that the pseudoephedrine he was selling (\$7,000 to \$10,000 a pound) had been stolen from a manufacturing plant. Subsequent investigation lead to a recorded conversation with Harvey wherein he states that there is "a lot of E" around and showed the Morris a bag containing 4 to 6 ounces of methamphetamine. He also talked about "Ryan" as a source for pseudoephedrine. Ryan was later determined to be co-defendant Ryan Breit.

On 06-13-2007, Morris was arrested in possession of approximately one ounce of methamphetamine. She gave information about her source, Harvey. Harvey told her his pseudoephedrine source was a pregnant woman, later identified as co-defendant Gina Vigliaturo. Harvey claimed that Vigliaturo stated her source was someone responsible for disposing of the pseudoephedrine.

On 06-14-2007, a search warrant was executed at Harvey's. \$35,880 in cash and a non-operational methamphetamine lab were seized, including 178 grams of 99% pure pseudoephedrine.

In a later *Mirandized* statement, Harvey identified Vigliaturo as his source for pseudoephedrine. He obtained pseudoephedrine from her at least five times for a total of 17 to 20 pounds at \$5,000 to \$6,000 per pound. He had cooked methamphetamine approximately 10 times in the preceding year and that each cook yielded 30 to 50 grams but on one cook he got 120 grams. He sold it for \$300 to \$800 per 1/8 ounce (approximately \$60,000).

Harvey identified defendant Stacey Walker as Vigliaturo's source and that Walker's source was a man responsible for the disposal of drugs or chemicals. Harvey stated that Vigliaturo identified a man (later identified as co-defendant Robert Jameson) that purchased large amounts of pseudoephedrine from Walker.

Harvey stated that he sold most of the pseudoephedrine he obtained to Breit for \$6,500 a pound (approximately \$90,000). He also stated that he sold pseudoephedrine and methamphetamine to various others, including Morris.

Morris was again interviewed and she identified co-defendant Kristi Stephenson as a "big time" pseudoephedrine distributor. Morris also identified Jameson as helping Stephenson distribute pseudoephedrine.

On April 3, 2007 a search warrant was executed at the residence of co-defendant Blake Folsom. He was found in possession of parts of a methamphetamine lab and 512 grams of pseudoephedrine. He admitted to cooking on more than one occasion and obtaining the pseudoephedrine for \$7,000.00 and to knowing the source for the "high grade" pseudoephedrine.

On 06-05-2007, Folsom was again interviewed. Therein he identified Walker and co-defendant Timothy Greathouse as discussing methamphetamine manufacture with him

³Throughout this case the terms ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are both used interchangeably when discussing pseudoephedrine. The speakers also use the street terms ("pseudo", "E", "white") for both, interchangeably.

and that they "had it all" referring to manufacturing implements and chemicals. Folsom stated that Walker gave him two pounds of pseudoephedrine, glassware, red phosphorus and black iodine to manufacture methamphetamine. Folsom stated he observed three five gallon buckets with multiple 2 pounds bags of pseudoephedrine in Walker's basement. He stated that he had seen Walker with more than \$20,000 in cash on multiple occasions. She told him information about her source that was later used to identify Hankins. Folsom accompanied Walker to the residence of Jameson to drop off 1 or 2 pounds of pseudoephedrine. Folsom identified a "Jeremiah" as another customer of Walker's pseudoephedrine distribution. This was later determined to be Jeremiah Harris.

On several dates in 2008 and 2009, Harris was interviewed as a part of this investigation. Harris admitted that until his arrest on an April 2008 federal indictment for his involvement in a large methamphetamine manufacturing conspiracy, he continued to be involved in methamphetamine manufacturing even after the Fall 2007 Platte County methamphetamine laboratory explosion that lead to his eventual indictment, arrest and conviction.

Harris stated that one of the defendants in the Harris' case, told Harris that Stephenson had supplied pseudoephedrine on multiple occasions in an amount of 10 to 20 pounds each time for a total of 100 pounds. Harris was present on two of those occasions.

In January 2007, Harris began getting pseudoephedrine from Vigliaturo, Walker and Greathouse. The first transaction, for three pounds, occurred at Walker's house and Hankins was present. Harris conducted approximately 20 total transactions with Vigliaturo, Walker and Greathouse for a total of 150 to 200 pounds at \$5,500.00 a pound. The transactions occurred weekly.

The last transaction with Walker was for \$80,000 for 16 pounds. This pseudoephedrine was bad and Harris attempted to get it replaced or get his money back. Finally, in July of 2007, Walker gave Harris directions to Hankins' residence in Oak Grove. Harris traveled to the residence to meet with Hankins. Upon arrival, he initially encountered who he later identified from a photograph as co-defendant Julie Hankins (now Torneden), the then wife of Hankins. He informed Torneden he was looking for Hankins and Torneden went to get Hankins. When they returned, Torneden requested Harris to raise his shirt so she could see that Harris wasn't "wearing a wire." Harris did so and then began talking to Hankins about why he was there. Shortly, Torneden left them and went back into the house.

Hankins eventually agreed to replace the pseudoephedrine and Harris agreed to deal directly with Hankins at the same price Harris had been paying Walker, \$5,000.00 a pound. Harris and Hankins conducted no less than five and no more than 10 transactions for a total of 30 to 50 pounds.

Walker told Harris that Jameson purchased 10 pounds of pseudoephedrine directly from Hankins. The last deal that Harris did with Hankins, he (Hankins) indicated he was out of pseudoephedrine but for the last 35 pounds and that part of it was going to an individual Harris determined to be Jameson. Harris bought the remaining 15 or 20 pounds. Vigliaturo told Harris that she and Walker sold pound quantities of

pseudoephedrine to Harvey. Harris identified photographs of Stephenson, Vigliaturo, Walker, Hankins, Julie Hankins Torneden and Greathouse.

Harris sold and fronted more than 10 pounds of pseudoephedrine to Breit. If it was fronted, Breit would pay for it later in cash and methamphetamine that Breit had cooked using the fronted pseudoephedrine. Harris stated that he (Harris) and Breit had cooked methamphetamine together on several occasions at two different locations.

On Thursday, May 21, 2009, Walker was arrested and interviewed. She stated she had been involved with Hankins, Hankins Torneden, Greathouse, Stephenson, and Harris in distributing pseudoephedrine. The distribution began with just Hankins around 2002 and ended around 2007. Walker stated that she sold pseudoephedrine Hankins fronted her for thousands of dollars a pound. She admitted to selling no less than 50 pounds.

On Thursday, May 21, 2009, Hankins was arrested and interviewed. Hankins admitted Torneden knew of his activities and enjoyed the proceeds there from. He admitted to knowing Walker and Harris and selling them pseudoephedrine. He admitted to obtaining the pseudoephedrine through his job at Heritage, from the waste they obtained from Sanofi-Aventis. He admitted to stealing and selling pseudoephedrine for ten (10) years. He stated that Walker sold it for three to five thousand a pound.

On Thursday, May 21, 2009 Stephenson and Jameson were arrested at separate locations. In Stephenson's residence a methamphetamine laboratory was located along with other controlled substances and items of drug paraphernalia. Similar discoveries were made at Jameson's residence including a large amount of pharmaceutical grade pseudoephedrine and several firearms.

The known legitimate sources of income would not support the lifestyle and assets of Hankins and Hankins Torneden and therefore, based on that and admissions by Hankins, the monies recovered are from the sale of pseudoephedrine, commingled with other possible legitimate funds and also represent substitute assets.

4. Use of Factual Admissions and Relevant Conduct. The defendant acknowledges, understands and agrees that the any admissions contained in this plea agreement will be used for the purpose of determining her guilt and advisory sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G."), including the calculation of the defendant's offense level in accordance with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). The defendant acknowledges, understands and agrees that the conduct charged in any dismissed counts of the indictment as well as all other uncharged related criminal activity may be considered as "relevant conduct" pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) in calculating the offense level for the charges to which she is pleading guilty.

- 5. Statutory Penalties. The defendant understands that upon her plea of guilty to Count Two of the indictment charging her with conspiracy to possess a listed chemical, pseudoephedrine, knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe that it would be used to manufacture a controlled substance, the maximum penalty the Court may impose is not more than Twenty (20) years. The maximum fine is \$250,000.00, and the court shall impose not more than three (3) years of supervised release and a \$100 mandatory special assessment per felony count of conviction which must be paid in full at the time of sentencing. The defendant further understands that this offense is a Class C felony.
- **6.** <u>Sentencing Procedures</u>. The defendant acknowledges, understands and agrees to the following:
 - a. in determining the appropriate sentence, the Court will consult and consider the United States Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission; these Guidelines, however, are advisory in nature, and the Court may impose a sentence either less than or greater than the defendant's applicable Guidelines range, unless the sentence imposed is "unreasonable";
 - b. the Court will determine the defendant's applicable Sentencing Guidelines range at the time of sentencing;
 - c. in addition to a sentence of imprisonment, the Court shall impose a term of supervised release of not less than five (5) years;
 - d. if the defendant violates a condition of supervised release, the Court may revoke her supervised release and impose an additional period of imprisonment without credit for time previously spent on supervised release. In addition to a new term of imprisonment, the Court also may impose a new period of supervised release;
 - e. the Court may impose any sentence authorized by law, including a sentence that is outside of, or departs from, the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range;

- f. any sentence of imprisonment imposed by the Court will not allow for parole;
- g. the Court is not bound by any recommendation regarding the sentence to be imposed or by any calculation or estimation of the Sentencing Guidelines range offered by the parties or the United States Probation Office; and
- h. the defendant may not withdraw her guilty plea solely because of the nature or length of the sentence imposed by the Court.
- 7. Government's Agreements. Based upon evidence in its possession at this time, the United States Attorney's Office for the Western District of Missouri, as part of this plea agreement, agrees not to bring any additional charges against defendant for any federal criminal offenses related to this indictment for conspiracy to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine and conspiracy to possess a listed chemical, pseudoephedrine, knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe that it would be used to manufacture a controlled substance for which it has venue and which arose out of the defendant's conduct described above. The Government agrees to dismiss Count One at sentencing.

The defendant understands that this plea agreement does not foreclose any prosecution for an act of murder or attempted murder, an act or attempted act of physical or sexual violence against the person of another, or a conspiracy to commit any such acts of violence or any criminal activity of which the United States Attorney for the Western District of Missouri has no knowledge.

The defendant recognizes that the United States' agreement to forego prosecution of all of the criminal offenses with which the defendant might be charged is based solely on the promises made by the defendant in this agreement. If the defendant breaches this plea agreement, the United States retains the right to proceed with the original charges and any other criminal

violations established by the evidence. The defendant expressly waives the right to challenge the initiation of the dismissed or additional charges against the defendant if the defendant breaches this agreement. The defendant expressly waives the right to assert a statute of limitations defense if the dismissed or additional charges are initiated against the defendant following a breach of this agreement. The defendant further understands and agrees that if the Government elects to file additional charges against the defendant following a breach of this plea agreement, the defendant will not be allowed to withdraw the guilty plea.

- 8. Preparation of Presentence Report. The defendant understands the United States will provide to the Court and the United States Probation Office a government version of the offense conduct. This may include information concerning the background, character, and conduct of the defendant, including the entirety of the defendant's criminal activities. The defendant understands these disclosures are not limited to the counts to which the defendant has pleaded guilty. The United States may respond to comments made or positions taken by the defendant or the defendant's counsel or by anyone on defendant's behalf and to correct any misstatements or inaccuracies. The United States further reserves its right to make any recommendations it deems appropriate regarding the disposition of this case, subject only to any limitations set forth in this plea agreement. The United States and the defendant expressly reserve the right to speak to the Court at the time of sentencing pursuant to Rule 32(i)(4) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
- 9. Withdrawal of Plea. Either party reserves the right to withdraw from this plea agreement for any or no reason at any time prior to the entry of the defendant's plea of guilty and its formal acceptance by the Court. In the event of such withdrawal, the parties will be restored

to their pre-plea agreement positions to the fullest extent possible. However, after the plea has been formally accepted by the Court, the defendant may withdraw the plea of guilty only if the Court rejects the plea agreement or if the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal. The defendant understands that if the Court accepts the plea of guilty and this plea agreement but subsequently imposes a sentence that is outside the defendant's applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, or imposes a sentence that the defendant does not expect, like or agree with, the defendant will not be permitted to withdraw the plea of guilty.

- 10. <u>Agreed Guidelines Applications</u>. With respect to the application of the Sentencing Guidelines to this case, the parties stipulate and agree as follows:
 - a. The Sentencing Guidelines do not bind the Court and are advisory in nature. The Court may impose a sentence that is either above or below the defendant's applicable Guidelines range, provided the sentence imposed is not "unreasonable":
 - b. The applicable Guidelines section for the offense of conviction is U.S.S.G. § 2D1.11, which provides for a base offense level 30, but the parties reserve the right to address at sentencing the pre-sentence report or Court determined drug level;
 - c. While the parties recognize there might be other specific aggravating or mitigating U.S.S.G. applications applicable to this defendant, including mitigating role in the offense, the parties elect to address those at sentencing whether or not applied by the pre-sentence report or Court;
 - d. The defendant appears to have admitted her guilt and accepted responsibility for her actions, and by timely notifying authorities of the intention to enter a plea of guilty has thereby permitted the Government to avoid preparing for trial and permitted the Government and the Court to allocate their resources efficiently. Therefore, the defendant appears entitled to a three-level reduction pursuant to § 3E1.1(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines and the Government, at the time of sentencing, will make a motion with the Court to that effect unless the defendant (1) fails to abide by all of the terms and conditions of this plea agreement and any pretrial release orders; or (2) attempts to withdraw this guilty

plea, violates the law, or otherwise engages in conduct inconsistent with an acceptance of responsibility;

- e. There is no agreement between the parties regarding the defendant's criminal history category, including any enhancements that might be applicable due to any criminal history the defendant may have. The parties agree that the Court will determine the applicable criminal history category after receipt of the presentence investigation report prepared by the United States Probation Office;
- f. The defendant understands that the estimate of the parties with respect to the Guidelines computation set forth in the subsections of this paragraph does <u>not</u> bind the Court or the United States Probation Office with respect to the appropriate Guidelines levels. Additionally, the failure of the Court to accept these stipulations will not, as outlined in Paragraph 9 of this plea agreement, provide the defendant with a basis to withdraw this plea of guilty;
- g. The United States agrees not to seek an upward departure from the Guidelines or a sentence outside the Guidelines range, and defendant agrees to not seek a downward departure from the Guidelines or a sentence outside the Guidelines range. The agreement by the parties to not seek a departure from the Guidelines is not binding upon the Court or the United States Probation Office and the Court may impose any sentence authorized by law, including any sentence outside the applicable Guidelines range that is not "unreasonable";
- h. The defendant consents to judicial fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence for all issues pertaining to the determination of the defendant's sentence, specifically including but not limited to: the determination of any mandatory minimum sentence; the facts that support any specific offense characteristic or other enhancement or adjustment, and; any legally authorized increase above the normal statutory maximum. The defendant waives any right to a jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt of all facts used to determine and enhance the sentence imposed, and waives any right to have those facts alleged in the indictment. The defendant also agrees that the Court, in finding the facts relevant to the imposition of sentence, may consider any reliable information, including hearsay; and
- i. The defendant understands and agrees that the factual admissions contained in this plea agreement, and any admissions that the defendant may make during any plea colloquy, support the imposition of the agreed-upon Guidelines calculations contained in this agreement.

- 11. Effect of Non-Agreement on Guidelines Applications. The parties understand, acknowledge and agree that there are no agreements between the parties with respect to any Sentencing Guidelines issues other than those specifically listed in Paragraph 10, and its subsections. As to any other Guidelines issues, the parties are free to advocate their respective positions at the sentencing hearing.
- 12. Change in Guidelines Prior to Sentencing. The defendant agrees that if any applicable provision of the Guidelines changes after the execution of this plea agreement, then any request by the defendant to be sentenced pursuant to the new Guidelines will make this plea agreement voidable by the United States at its option. If the Government exercises its option to void the plea agreement, the United States may charge, reinstate, or otherwise pursue any and all criminal charges that could have been brought but for this plea agreement.
- 13. Government's Reservation of Rights. The defendant understands that the United States expressly reserves the right in this case to:
 - a. oppose or take issue with any position advanced by defendant or others on the defendant's behalf at the sentencing hearing;
 - b. comment on the evidence supporting the charge in the indictment;
 - c. oppose any arguments and requests for relief the defendant or others on the defendant's behalf might advance on an appeal from the sentences imposed and that the United States remains free on appeal or collateral proceedings to defend the legality and propriety of the sentence actually imposed, even if the Court chooses not to follow any recommendation made by the United States; and
 - d. oppose any post-conviction motions for reduction of sentence, or other relief.
- **14.** Waiver of Constitutional Rights. The defendant, by pleading guilty, acknowledges being advised of, understanding, and knowingly and voluntarily waiving the following rights:

- a. the right to plead not guilty and to persist in a plea of not guilty;
- b. the right to be presumed innocent until guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt at trial;
- c. the right to a jury trial, and at that trial, the right to the effective assistance of counsel;
 - d. the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who testify;
- e. the right to compel or subpoena witnesses to appear for the defendant; and
- f. the right to remain silent at trial, and that silence may not be used against the defendant.

The defendant understands that by pleading guilty, she waives or gives up those rights and that there will be no trial. The defendant further understands that if she pleads guilty, the Court may ask questions about the offense or offenses to which she pleaded guilty, and if the defendant answers those questions under oath and in the presence of counsel, the answers may later be used against the defendant in a prosecution for perjury or making a false statement. The defendant also understands she has pleaded guilty to a felony offense and, as a result, will lose the right to possess a firearm or ammunition and might be deprived of other rights, such as the right to vote or register to vote, hold public office, or serve on a jury.

15. Waiver of Appellate and Post-Conviction Rights.

a. The defendant acknowledges, understands and agrees that by this *unconditional* plea of guilty pursuant to this plea agreement she waives her right to appeal or collaterally attack a finding of guilt following the acceptance of this plea agreement, except on grounds of (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; or (2) prosecutorial misconduct.

b. The defendant expressly waives the right to appeal the sentence, directly or collaterally, on any ground except claims of (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; or (3) an illegal sentence. An "illegal sentence" includes a sentence imposed in excess of the statutory maximum, but does *not* include less serious sentencing errors, such as a misapplication of the Sentencing Guidelines, an abuse of discretion, or the imposition of an unreasonable sentence. However, if the United States exercises its right to appeal the sentence imposed as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b), the defendant is released from this waiver and may, as part of the Government's appeal, crossappeal the sentence as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) with respect to any issues that have not been stipulated to or agreed upon in this agreement.

16. Financial Obligations.

By entering into this plea agreement, the defendant represents that she understands and agrees to the following financial obligations:

- a. The Court may order restitution to any victims of the offense to which the defendant is pleading guilty. The defendant agrees that the Court may order restitution in connection with the conduct charged in any counts of the indictment which are to be dismissed and all other uncharged related criminal activity.
- b. The United States may use the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act and any other remedies provided by law to enforce any restitution order that may be entered as part of the sentence in this case and to collect any fine or other assessment against the defendant.
- c. The defendant will fully and truthfully disclose all assets and property in which she has any interest, or over which the defendant exercises control directly or indirectly, including assets and property held by a spouse, nominee or other third party. The defendant's disclosure obligations are ongoing, and are in force from the execution of this agreement until the defendant has satisfied the restitution order in full.

- d. Within 10 days of the execution of this plea agreement, at the request of the USAO, the defendant agrees to execute and submit (1) a Tax Information Authorization form; (2) an Authorization to Release Information; (3) a completed financial disclosure statement; and (4) copies of financial information that the defendant submits to the U.S. Probation Office. The defendant understands that compliance with these requests will be taken into account when the United States makes a recommendation to the Court regarding the defendant's acceptance of responsibility.
- e. At the request of the USAO, the defendant agrees to undergo any polygraph examination the United States might choose to administer concerning the identification and recovery of substitute assets and restitution.
- f. The defendant hereby authorizes the USAO to obtain a credit report pertaining to the defendant to assist the USAO in evaluating the defendant's ability to satisfy any financial obligations imposed as part of the sentence.
- g. The defendant understands that a Special Assessment will be imposed as part of the sentence in this case. The defendant promises to pay the Special Assessment of \$100.00 by submitting a satisfactory form of payment to the Clerk of the Court prior to appearing for the sentencing proceeding in this case. The defendant agrees to provide the Clerk's receipt as evidence of the fulfillment of this obligation at the time of sentencing.
- h. The defendant certifies that she has made no transfer of assets or property for the purpose of (1) evading financial obligations created by this Agreement; (2) evading obligations that may be imposed by the Court; nor (3) hindering efforts of the USAO to enforce such financial obligations. Moreover, the defendant promises that she will make no such transfers in the future.
- i. In the event the United States learns of any misrepresentation in the financial disclosure statement, or of any asset in which the defendant had an interest at the time of this plea agreement that is not disclosed in the financial disclosure statement, and in the event such misrepresentation or nondisclosure changes the estimated net worth of the defendant by ten thousand dollars (\$10,000.00) or more, the United States may at its option: (1) choose to be relieved of its obligations under this plea agreement; or (2) let the plea agreement stand, collect the full forfeiture, restitution, and fines imposed by any criminal or civil judgment, and also collect 100% (one hundred percent) of the value of any previously undisclosed assets. The defendant agrees not to contest any collection of such assets. In the event the United States opts to be relieved of its obligations under this plea agreement, the defendant's previously entered pleas of guilty shall remain in effect and cannot be withdrawn.

- 17. Waiver of FOIA Request. The defendant waives all rights, whether asserted directly or by a representative, to request or receive from any department or agency of the United States any records pertaining to the investigation or prosecution of this case including, without limitation, any records that may be sought under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, or the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
- 18. Waiver of Claim for Attorney's Fees. The defendant waives all claims under the Hyde Amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, for attorney's fees and other litigation expenses arising out of the investigation or prosecution of this matter.
- 19. <u>Defendant's Agreement to Destruction of Biological Evidence</u>. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3600A(c)(2), the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to request DNA testing of any biological evidence which may have been obtained or seized by law enforcement in this case. Defendant agrees that all biological evidence which may have been obtained or seized may be destroyed by law enforcement authorities.
- 20. <u>Defendant's Breach of Plea Agreement</u>. If the defendant commits any crimes, violates any conditions of release, or violates any term of this plea agreement between the signing of this plea agreement and the date of sentencing, or fails to appear for sentencing, or if the defendant provides information to the Probation Office or the Court that is intentionally misleading, incomplete, or untruthful, or otherwise breaches this plea agreement, the United States will be released from its obligations under this agreement. The defendant, however, will remain bound by the terms of the agreement, and will not be allowed to withdraw this plea of guilty.

The defendant also understands and agrees that in the event of a violation of this plea

agreement, all statements made to law enforcement agents subsequent to the execution of this plea agreement, any testimony given before a grand jury or any tribunal or any leads from such statements or testimony shall be admissible against the defendant in any and all criminal proceedings. The defendant waives any rights under the United States Constitution, any statute, Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, or any other federal rule that pertains to the admissibility of any statements made by the defendant subsequent to this plea agreement.

- 21. <u>Defendant's Representations</u>. The defendant acknowledges that she has entered into this plea agreement freely and voluntarily after receiving the effective assistance, advice and approval of counsel. The defendant acknowledges satisfaction with the assistance of counsel, and that counsel has fully advised the defendant of all rights and obligations in connection with this plea agreement. The defendant further acknowledges that no threats or promises, other than the promises contained in this plea agreement, have been made by the United States, the Court, the defendant's attorneys or any other party to induce this plea of guilty.
- 22. No Undisclosed Terms. The United States and defendant acknowledge and agree that the above-stated terms and conditions, together with any written supplemental agreement that might be presented to the Court in camera, constitute the entire plea agreement between the parties, and that any other terms and conditions not expressly set forth in this agreement or any written supplemental agreement do not constitute any part of the parties' agreement and will not be enforceable against either party.

23. Standard of Interpretation. The parties agree that, unless the constitutional implications inherent in plea agreements require otherwise, this plea agreement should be interpreted according to general contract principles and the words employed are to be given their normal and ordinary meanings. The parties further agree that, in interpreting this agreement, any drafting errors or ambiguities are not to be automatically construed against either party, whether or not that party was involved in drafting or modifying this agreement.

		United States Attorney
Dated:	12/2/09	/s/ Bruce Rhoades
		Bruce Rhoades Assistant United States Attorney

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I have consulted with my attorney and fully understand all of my rights with respect to the offenses charged in the indictment. Further, I have consulted with my attorney and fully understand my rights with respect to the provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines and any statutory minimum sentences. I have read this plea agreement and carefully reviewed every part of it with my attorney. I understand this plea agreement and I voluntarily agree to it.

12/2/09	/s/ Julie Ann Weber Hankins Torneden
Dated:	
	Julie Ann Weber Hankins Torneden
	Defendant

I am defendant Julie Ann Weber Hankins Torneden's attorney. I have fully explained her rights with respect to the offenses charged in the indictment. Further, I have reviewed with the defendant the provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines and statutory minimum sentences which might apply in this case. I have carefully reviewed every part of this plea agreement with the defendant. To my knowledge, Julie Ann Weber Hankins Torneden's decision to enter into this plea agreement is an informed and voluntary one.

12/2/09	/s/ Tricia A. Tenpenny	
Dated:		
	Tricia A. Tenpenny	
	Attorney for Defendant	