This paper will compare and contrast the strategic writings of Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini, 19th Century military strategists. It will discuss geo-political forces and individual experiences instrumental in shaping each theorist's hypothesis about war and conclude with a discussion of Clausewitz's major contributions to strategic thought.
While both contributed significantly to military theory in their own time and continue to influence strategic thinking today, their varied approaches often did not coincide. Their individual views were strongly influenced by the Napoleonic wars and Prussian military doctrine. Like Clausewitz, Jomini observed first hand the upheaval of the French Revolution and the dramatic events that molded history during the Napoleonic period. Jomini developed an appetite for strategic study early in his military career and published his first work at age 25 with the help of General Ney, a mentor and influential leader in the French Army.
John Shy's essay, Makers of Modern Strategy, discusses this French influence. The French revolutionized warfare and enjoyed unprecedented results. Command was decentralized, the force was largely conscripted, and power, political and military, was vested in one leader. Napoleon, less concerned about individual victories or defeats, was convinced that it was important to totally destroy the enemy through massed concentration of force. Acquisition of territory was often a secondary consideration. According to Shy, it was this experience, gained first hand through observation, that was most instrumental in Jomini's formation of theoretical ideas and provided the underpinnings for his work.
Jomini is best known for his Treatise on Grand Military Operations and Precis of the Art of War, essentially interpretations of the Napoleonic experience. Most writers agree his intent was to publish a "handbook" or "field manual" which would summarize the principles he believed were responsible for Napoleon's unprecedented successes. Colonel Swain notes that "... for Jomini it was the principles of strategy which were timeless [and] ... the end of theory was a set of principles to serve as a guide for action."note 1
Shy says Jomini sought simplicity and clarity and was quick to " ... extol the Napoleonic model of massing, attacking, and quickly winning decisive victories." In keeping with the "principles," these attacks should be conducted against weak points in enemy formations and fortifications (or undefended territory) relying on the doctrine of "lines of operation." The key, according to Jomini, was to identify the "decisive point" and strike. Jomini separated military activity into three categories -- strategy, grand tactics, and logistics. He provided early definitions for modern concepts such as the "theater of operation" and the "COMMZ."
Significantly, in contrast with Clausewitz, Jomini had little concern with political implications. Shy says, for Jomini "[t]he lesson was clear: a government should choose its ablest military commander, then leave him free to wage war according to scientific principles." note 2
Jomini's critics accuse him of engaging in over simplification and lack of flexibility. If empirical evidence did not support his theory, he ignored it. Unlike Clausewitz, he was vague and contradicted himself on the importance of genius. Liddell Hart has accused Clausewitz of having a suicidal obsession with the great battle, a criticism that applies equally to Jomini.
Carl von Clausewitz and Jomini's military careers were similar in many respects. Clausewitz also was an early student of strategy and relied on similar empirical experience to develop and nurture his theories. He too benefitted from an influential mentor relationship with Gerhard von Scharnhost, a prominent Prussian Army General, and, through Scharnhorst's influence, rose quickly in the Prussian Army. Both he and Jomini attained generalships and both grew disenchanted with their own situations and ended up accepting appointments in the Russian Army.
Clausewitz is best know for his treatise, On War. Shy notes, "[t]o devise effective strategic schemes and tactical measures mattered far less to him than to identify the permanent elements of war and come to understand how they function." He believed leaders must be thoroughly schooled in the theoretical study of war and that such theory must be highly flexible. A key tenet of the theory is that leaders must be willing to make accommodations for the "imponderables" (e.g. modern air power and nuclear weapons). The theory must have room to grow and develop. On War emphasizes the importance of military genius, another imponderable that can alter the outcome of an otherwise equal clash.
It was Clausewitz's idea that war is an extreme but natural extension of political policy -- the ultimate tool of diplomacy. In his words, "War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means." He firmly believed that war had a dual nature and that warfare could be either absolute or limited, depending on what modern writers term the objectives of the political grand strategy.
He saw war as a great trinity composed of violence and passion; uncertainty, chance, and probability (his concept of friction);(note 3) and political purpose and effect. Friction, in conjunction with individual genius, in his view, could often make the difference in the outcome of an engagement between two forces otherwise equal in raw strength. Note 4.
Both Jomini and Clausewitz agreed that total victory could only be achieved through the attack. Nevertheless, as Luttwak points out, Clausewitz's concept of the "culminating point of victory" is still valid and the strategist should take care not to overextend during the attack (e.g. initial French and German successes in the Napoleonic wars and WW II, respectively, while attacking Russia).
One criticism of Clausewitz has been his seeming failure to address the ethical considerations of war. He saw ethics as a political question; not an issue of concern for pure theory. Also, he failed entirely to consider sea power (Jomini gave it passing reference), although a persuasive argument can be made that his theories are certainly easily adaptable to a total force concept (sea, air and land). Note 5.
The ideas in On War continue to have validity. The concepts of purpose (why is it politically expedient to fight); objectives (what goals -- pure destruction of an enemy, acquisition of territory, or economical or ideological advantage?); and, the means employed (spectrum of limited to total war) are as important today as in Clausewitz's time. Indeed, the Persian Gulf war is a classic example of force used as ultimate diplomacy. The strategy was set at the national level and decisive action ensued, resulting in overwhelming victory.
The Viet Nam experience and the gulf war validate Clausewitz, as does the winning of the "Cold War." The fact that one is considered a failure and the others overwhelming successes is irrelevant. The teacher can only impart knowledge -- not insure that it is used wisely and productively. While total war on a grand scale is less likely, limited wars waged with limited objectives will continue to occur. Because of this, Clausewitz's ideas are probably more important to the strategist today than at any previous time in modern history.
2. Ironically, while Clausewitz's view that politics must play a key role in military strategy is generally accepted as correct, many would argue that the failure to adhere to this Jomini principle was one of the main failures of the Viet Nam grand strategy.
3. Friction refers to uncertainties, errors, accidents, technical difficulties, the unforseen, and to their effect on decisions, morale, and actions, according to Shy.
4. Edward Luttwak sees friction as one of the great paradoxes of war. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace
5. John E. Shephard, Jr.'s article, On War: Is Clausewitz Still Relevant, does not agree and says his concepts are not "sufficiently comprehensive." Ironically, his article seems to support a contrary conclusion.