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                   IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                   FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
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                             WESTERN DIVISION
                                   ) Case No. 08-00026-02/05-CR-W-FJG
   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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              Plaintiff,
                                   ) Kansas City, Missouri
                                   ) October 21, 2008
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   TROY R. SOLOMON,
   CHRISTOPHER L. ELDER,
   DELMON L. JOHNSON,
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              Defendants.
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                      TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS CONFERENCE
                    BEFORE THE HONORABLE SARAH W. HAYS
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                      UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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   APPEARANCES:
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(Court in Session at 9:40 a.m.)
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            THE COURT: All right. Good morning.
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            MR. RHODES: Good morning.
            THE COURT: We're here on Case No. 08-26. If counsel
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   would state their appearance for the record?
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            MR. RHODES: Rudolph Rhodes for the Government.
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            MR. BOHLING: And Curt Bohling.
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            MR. OSGOOD: John Osgood on behalf of Dr. Elders, who's
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   present in court, Your Honor.
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            MR. BANNWART: Anthony Bannwart on behalf of Defendant
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   Solomon and Defendant Johnson.
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            THE COURT: Now, who do we have on the phone?
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            MS. RUDEN: Mary Grace Ruden on the phone. I don't
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   think we have Mr. Lewis on behalf of Troy Solomon.
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            THE COURT: All right. I know that they said they tried
   to reach him and couldn't reach Mr. Lewis, but we do have counsel
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   here for Mr. Solomon, correct?
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            MR. BANNWART: Yes, Your Honor.
            THE COURT: And are either Mr. Solomon or Mr. Johnson on
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   the phone?
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            MR. BANNWART: Not to my knowledge, Your Honor.
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            MS. RUDEN: I do not have Mr. Solomon with me.
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            THE COURT: All right. And did you -- I mean give them
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   the option of participating by phone today?
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            MS. RUDEN: Yes, Your Honor.
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MR. BANNWART: Yes, Your Honor, they're waiving their appearance.

THE COURT: All right. Now, Ms. Ruden, can you hear people when they're not speaking directly into the microphone?

MS. RUDEN: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: All right. If you have any trouble hearing, why let us know.

MS. RUDEN: Thank you.

THE COURT: As I understand the issues that we were here to address today were twofold. One, was to talk about the standing issue which the Court wanted a chance to review before we determined whether we were going to set a full-blown suppression hearing on Mr. Elder's -- Dr. Elder's Motion to Suppress. And then the second was to make sure that the discovery was going smoothly and that there weren't any further problems. So, turning to the standing issue, does anyone want an opportunity to argue that issue further, to make any further comments? Let me ask this. Because Solomon and Johnson kind of did a "me too" join in on the motion to suppress issue, do you have any arguments to make on behalf of your clients as to why they would have standing to raise this suppression issue?

MR. BANNWART: Sure, Your Honor. At one time Mr. Solomon was a partial owner of South Texas Wellness Center.

THE COURT: Well, at one time, at what time?

MR. BANNWART: At the time that these reimbursements

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took place.
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            MR. RHODES: I have no such information. This is the
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   first time I've heard of it.
            THE COURT: Well, who is it that you think owns South
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   Texas Wellness Center?
            MR. RHODES: Ada Johnson and Pleshette Johnson
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            THE COURT: All right. I'm sorry. Give me their names
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   again.
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            MR. RHODES: Ada.
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            THE COURT: Okay. Ada.
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            MR. RHODES: A-D-A.
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            THE COURT: Okay.
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            MR. RHODES: And Pleshette, P-L-E-S-H-E-T-T-E, Johnson,
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   and I believe it's her husband. And her husband's name has
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   failed me right now. He's also an owner.
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            THE COURT: Who?
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            MR. RHODES: The owner's name, the husband of I believe
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   it's Ada, may also be an owner of this business, but his first
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   name has failed me at this time, Your Honor.
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            THE COURT: Feldman?
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            MR. BANNWART: Luther.
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            MR. RHODES: Huh?
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            MR. BANNWART: Luther.
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            MR. RHODES: Luther. Okay. Luther.
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THE COURT: Well, have you put forth -- I mean, the

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defendants have the burden of demonstrating standing. Any affidavits or anything in the record that would in any way suggest that in May, I believe it was of '06, when this search warrant was issued that your clients have some type of ownership interest?

MR. BANNWART: Your Honor, I have not put forth an affidavit. I have not verified it, but having done the corporate records myself, it is my understanding that it would be on file with the Secretary of State in the state of Texas.

THE COURT: And that is you're saying Mr. Solomon was a partial owner. What about Defendant Johnson?

MR. BANNWART: Defendant Johnson was nothing more than an employee at all times during this case.

THE COURT: He was an employee of South Texas Wellness Center?

MR. BANNWART: No, ma'am. He was an employee of Ascencia. I apologize --

THE COURT: He was an employee of what?

MR. BANNWART: Ascencia Nutritional Pharmacy.

THE COURT: Well, what's your argument as to why Johnson would have standing?

MR. BANNWART: There isn't one.

THE COURT: Well, I guess my concern, maybe this is why we're going to have to tell people they can't do "me too" briefs.

There is absolutely nothing in the briefing to suggest that

either Johnson or Solomon have standing. And I mean, I think we've addressed the Johnson issue, that you're not even making that argument. But I mean you have sought to join in for Mr. Solomon. I mean, he clearly has to establish his own independent standing. And on the basis of the record right now, there would be no reason to even have a hearing as to Solomon because there's just nothing suggesting that he has standing.

MR. BANNWART: Understood, Your Honor. I mean, I can supplement that prior to a hearing. I understand we're trying to --

THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to have a hearing -MR. BANNWART: Sure.

THE COURT: -- unless there's something to suggest there's standing. So --

MR. BANNWART: I --

THE COURT: -- in terms of it's your burden when you make a motion, and when you choose to join in as opposed to filing your own independent motion with facts attached through affidavits, you know, then the Court can look at that and say is there a reason to have a hearing. But I'm telling you on the basis of the present record, Solomon is not going to get a hearing unless there's something more in the record. And, you know, this is just prolonging this. The parties have had an extensive opportunity to already brief this.

MR. BANNWART: Understood, Your Honor, and I apologize

for that. I thought it was understood by all parties that he had an ownership interest in the business and I didn't even -- I didn't realize that was going to be an issue whether or not he had an ownership interest in South Texas Wellness. I mean, from my reading of the documents that have been produced to us, that's been an understanding for quite some time.

THE COURT: Well, he may have had an ownership interest, but -- and certainly that is not reflected in the material before the Court. Did he have a right to go on the premises? Did he have keys? Did he have access to these, you know, files? Did he have any right to possession and control of these records? Are you making that argument?

MR. BANNWART: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, are you saying he was like a silent partner or?

MR. BANNWART: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So, you're not claiming that he had a right to have any control over the records?

MR. BANNWART: He would have had a right to inspect the books and records and financial aspects of the dealings of South Texas Wellness Center.

THE COURT: A right to inspect the financial books and records?

MR. BANNWART: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Would he have had any right to physician or

patient records?

MR. BANNWART: He's not a physician, so I don't think legally under HIPAA he would. Although as an owner, I'm not -- I have to admit I'm a bit unclear about whether or not he would or not.

THE COURT: I'm just curious. What's the Government's position on the standing issue as to Mr. Solomon?

MR. RHODES: Number one is there is no evidence that he owned the business even as a silent partner. And that that was clearly also stated here in our response as well as we said he didn't lease the premises. So, he was put on notice that he didn't have any ownership or that he leased this business and that he has no expectation of privacy. At this point we were just engaging in the hypothetical if he were the owner of that business.

THE COURT: Well, but I think what he's saying is he wants an opportunity to file something. I mean, although we've had, you know, the deadline for filing these motions, I think, is already long passed. Our whole point today was to say do we have anything we need to have a hearing about, and when you haven't put forth the evidence or argument that would let the Court evaluate that, I mean we're kind of back to square one and yet we're months down the road.

MR. BANNWART: I understand that, Your Honor, and I apologize for that. Again, I thought it was generally understood

among everybody, and that that would not -- his ownership interest wasn't even an issue. But apparently it is. I wasn't aware that the state -- or the Government was going to challenge that particular point of his ownership interest. In what I had read, it appears that they knew or were assuming that all along, but apparently --

THE COURT: Well, here's the problem. It's the Court who decides standing, not either side. And when you say you thought the Government understood, the Government has clearly raised standing as an issue and somehow the, you know, information has to be conveyed to the Court so I can make a decision as to whether there's even a necessity to go forward and address the search warrant issues. So, and right now as I understand it, maybe I've missed something, all you've done is join in Dr. Elder's motion.

MR. BANNWART: We've joined in Dr. Elder's motion again, Your Honor, because Mr. Solomon had an ownership interest in the business at the time. I believe, but I cannot represent with certainty, that the corporate records on file with the State of Texas would reflect that, but I would have to pull those independently, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I guess right now what I'm interested in is the record before the Court. And when you joined in, did you make any indication in your join-in that we would have standing because of our ownership interest?

MR. BANNWART: To the extent that the Secretary of State for the State of Texas represents his corporate -- or ownership interest, I would ask that the Court take judicial notice. My problem is --

THE COURT: No, I'm not taking judicial notice of corporate records from Texas. I'm now looking at Document 115 which says, "COMES NOW Defendants Troy Solomon and Delmon Johnson and file this motion adopting and joining the Motion to Suppress All Evidence Seized from South Texas Wellness Center with Suggestions in Support previously filed by Defendant Christopher Elder in the above-entitled and numbered case together with all exhibits and attachments thereto." That's all the information you gave the Court.

MR. BANNWART: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: All right. Well, how do you want to proceed?

MR. BANNWART: Your Honor, I would ask for an opportunity to supplement that with proper documentation, and I would only need a day.

THE COURT: I'll give you give five days in which to file something with argument and whatever evidence you want to put in to suggest that Mr. Solomon has standing, and I'll give the Government 12 days to respond. And on the basis of those pleadings, it will be determined whether Mr. Solomon gets a hearing on the suppression issue.

MR. BANNWART: Very well, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right. Mr. Osgood.

MR. OSGOOD: Well, Your Honor, clearly, discovery does indicate and my motion indicates that Dr. Elder was an employee there. He terminated his employment. He was a part-time employee actually when he was an employee. He saw patients, prescribed medications for them, wrote prescriptions for them, and maintained medical records that are, in fact, the Texas Medical Board has since subpoenaed a bunch of his records from that facility, examined those and found them to be in order and properly documented and correct in all respects. specific patients that were still in the files of South Texas in their possession. I filed a supplemental citation of authority, which I'm sure you looked at yesterday citing three Supreme Court cases that I think collectively give us standing when you put them all together. Obviously, Jones was the old, legitimately on the premises case, which has been overruled by Rakas and later affirmed in Minnesota v. Carter. Under Rakas, the court said the real focus is legitimate expectation of privacy in the items to be seized. Here we have very sensitive medical records protected by the HIPAA Act. Those can only be disclosed in one of -- or gotten rid of in one of two ways, as I understand it. Maybe three. I don't know. But for sure it would require Dr. Elder to transfer the records to another doctor with the consent of the patient or the patient himself to come in and say these are my

records, I want them back. Otherwise, those records must, under the federal law, be maintained indefinitely. Unlike legal records which we can destroy after ten years, I don't believe there's any provision you can ever destroy a medical record. Therefore, Dr. Elder, clearly as a physician with his license at stake, had, even though he was no longer employed there, had every reason to believe that his records were under lock and key in the filing cabinets and in the filing folders where they belonged and that they would be there indefinitely unless and until he transferred them or the patient came in and retrieved them, so.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's stop right there. I guess I don't understand your argument and I certainly haven't seen any evidence to suggest that when he's working for an employer, Texas -- South Texas Wellness Center and that employer will basically be the one maintaining the records that, you know, your doctor has some right to order their transfer after he leaves there.

MR. OSGOOD: Then --

THE COURT: I mean, that's contrary to his own affidavit. He put in an affidavit that's attached to Document 129 saying that once he quit working there, "I didn't maintain control or possession of any records generated during my employment contract with the center." I mean, he seems to be saying the center is the one that has the records.

MR. OSGOOD: That was in response to could he physically

produce those for a grand jury. That did not mean he didn't have an expectation of privacy as the prescribing physician, and remember South Texas was run by these Johnson folks, Ada and Pleshette, and they are not pain doctors and they are not even physicians. They are, I believe, chiropractors. And they were not routinely prescribing this kind of medication. So, at best they were the custodians of these records which he had the primary interest in as the prescribing physician.

THE COURT: Well, aren't the records really the patients' records?

MR. OSGOOD: Pardon me?

THE COURT: Aren't the records really the patients' records?

MR. OSGOOD: They are. I concede that.

THE COURT: Isn't the patient who gets to control where they're moved and who transfers them and --

MR. OSGOOD: I would concede that but I would also suggest to the Court that if a doctor left the records out on a countertop and some other patient opened them up and read them, that the doctor would be subject to all kinds of disciplinary actions by the medical board. His license could be suspended or pulled. And so he has a clear interest in maintaining their privacy, and that's what this whole standing issue is about is the expectation of privacy over those records.

THE COURT: Well, after he left --

MR. OSGOOD: Not who had control.

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THE COURT: Yeah. After he left there, if somebody at South Texas Wellness Center had left the patient records out for somebody to read, it wouldn't be Dr. Elder who'd be in trouble, it would be South Texas Wellness Center.

MR. OSGOOD: Not necessarily. He would have to answer to the Texas Medical Board as to why this happened and what are the circumstances, and just because you no longer work there, did you make some kind of an arrangement or did you have some expectation that they would be controlled the way they're supposed to be under HIPAA and other controlling legislation. Now, I concede there's no -- I couldn't find any Eighth Circuit cases dealing directly with this. I think the closest case to this is O'Connor v. Ortega, the `87 case of the Supreme Court where he was a state employee and was on suspension and the court in that case -- he didn't win -- but the court did acknowledge that he, even though he wasn't there as an employee, had some expectation of privacy in the filing cabinets and the files that he had created while he was there as a psychiatrist. I think collectively, those three cases, therefore, give us standing.

THE COURT: Well, just so I'm clear, on the basis of the present record, I mean since he was no longer employed there, he didn't have access to the premises?

MR. OSGOOD: No, not as far as I know.

THE COURT: And he didn't have any ownership interest in

the premises or the business?

MR. OSGOOD: No.

THE COURT: And he no longer had, you know, the key to the premises or I guess that would be access.

MR. OSGOOD: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And so your only argument is that because these are medical records, he somehow had responsibility for them?

MR. OSGOOD: That would be accurate, Your Honor. But not responsibility as much as a reasonable expectation of privacy over them, that they would be maintained and controlled properly, and that his privacy interests have been violated at this point. In fact, he could file a civil suit against, and that's what this Ortega was about. He could file a civil suit against them for disclosing that information because it places his license in jeopardy.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. OSGOOD: That's all I've got, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Anything the Government wants to say in response?

MR. RHODES: Just briefly, Your Honor. It is true the Supreme Court recognized that a worker may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the desk and file cabinets located in his own private office. In Ortega, the only items found by the investigators were personal items. However, in this case the

computer was not in Elder's own private office. The items belonged to that -- the computer was in the receptionist area and that computer belongs to South Texas Wellness Center. It seems that the argument that Elder is making is is that his reasonable expectation of privacy extends throughout the entire office. Because of the nature of where that computer was in an area accessed to everyone, he does not have any type of ownership interest in that. As well as, according to his affidavit, as the Court has already stated, he said he worked for a temporary hire in South Texas Wellness Center and he did not maintain control or possession of any records generated during his employment contract with the South Texas Wellness Center. In his motion he says he only works part time. And the search warrant was executed at least ten months following his termination of employment. And in Ortega the person was still employed at the time. He was on paid administrative leave. Here, Dr. Elder was not still with the company. Therefore, these defendants have not met their burden and the Government asks that you find that they don't have standing to challenge the search warrant.

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MR. OSGOOD: His argument is circular because Dr. Elder was, in fact, the target in the search warrant which we've alleged is defective on a number of grounds. All we've got to do is get over the threshold standing argument. Probably in the search warrant they should have, if they're after Dr. Elder's records, more specifically identified what filing cabinets and

what files they wanted to look in. They didn't do it. All I've got to do is get over the standing hump to come in and argue about why this search warrant was over broad and was defective and I almost cheered counsel's admitting that it was over broad. They went in and took everything when, in realty, according to their affidavit, they were looking for stuff on Dr. Elder. So, all I've got to do is show this threshold standing argument to come in and gripe about the search warrant, which is what I'm trying to do, and I think counsel has almost opened the door to my argument.

MR. RHODES: Not in the least, Your Honor. Attachment B clearly shows that the main target was Dr. Peter Okose. All the items requested were pertaining to Dr. Peter Okose. So, when he makes this argument that his guy was the main target, it is disingenuous. If anything, it says the records of ownership or control of South Texas Wellness Center, not that regarding with Dr. Elder. And the only item recovered from that computer wasn't even medical records. It was a list of the patients.

MR. OSGOOD: One of the things in the affidavit that they were looking for was 107 packages shipped supposedly to the attention of Dr. Elder at this address. I just -- you know, they were clearly looking for his stuff here and he has a right, I think, at this point to contest the entire validity of this search warrant.

MR. BANNWART: And, Your Honor, to that extent the

affidavit attached to their -- well, the affidavit in support of the search warrant says that there were 188 packages shipped to Mr. Solomon's attention. If that, in fact, was also what they were looking for and we won't concede that those packages were shipped to him, but if that's, in fact, what they were looking for, then they're alleging on the face of the affidavit that he had packages there with his name on them, that he would surely have some expectation of privacy.

THE COURT: All right. Well, --

MR. RHODES: Nothing.

MR. OSGOOD:

THE COURT: -- here's the Court's position. I am not going to set a hearing on this motion until we've ruled the standing issue. It looks like it's fully briefed as to Dr. Elder and we're going to give Mr. Solomon the additional time to put something in, but when we get done ruling that, if we feel then there's a need for a hearing, we will set one. But on the basis of the Court's, you know, limited review of the briefing in the cases, I'm just very skeptical as to whether there's any standing here. And, therefore, I think that that clearly has to be dealt with in a legal fashion and we'll do that and give either side an opportunity to, you know, take that up to the District Judge before we make a decision about whether a hearing should be set. Turning to discovery issues, any problems, anything we need to talk about since the last time we were here to address discovery?

I've turned over a couple of thousand pages

of defense investigative work to counsel this morning. believe I've complied with the reciprocal requirement at this I did call Mr. Rhodes about this continuing issue of the investigation of Dr. Okose in Texas. I don't know whether he was joking or not, but Mr. Rhodes told me that he could not produce statements of Ada and Pleshette Johnson because of the hurricane that went through there and scattered all their records and they're trying to reassemble their records and can't find them. That's almost as bad as the dog ate my homework. nevertheless, I'm still waiting for the discovery on that related case down there, and Ada and Pleshette Johnson have always been, in my mind, key witnesses in this case, and it appears from the argument this morning that that's reaffirmed. So, I guess my question is when am I going to get the stuff from that investigation down there? We know they were continuing an investigation because they interviewed Mr. Lynch, who is the physician's assistant for Dr. Elder, and asked specific questions about Dr. Elder's practice and how he did things, as well as Dr. If you read the discovery we have to date, there is an absolute blending and commingling of the two cases and Dr. Okose is prominent in this case. One of the things that's interesting is in the grand jury itself, on the day that this was presented for indictment, the agent was asked why is Dr. Elder the only person on this indictment when you have this Dr. Botto and this Dr. Okose that are so prominent in this investigation.

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agent's response to that question by a grand juror was, well, we're handling Dr. Okose in Texas and we, for whatever reason, think Dr. Botto is credible. And the grand juror said, well, have you done his handwriting, and she said no, I just think he's credible. So, they didn't even do a handwriting comparison on him. And so --

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THE COURT: Well, let's get back to -- I think the real issue is the --

MR. OSGOOD: Okay. But the point is I don't --

THE COURT: -- relevant -- all right. The issue is the relevant case and the issue about where the records are and what impact the hurricanes have had on pulling that together.

I was posed two questions by Mr. MR. RHODES: Yes. Did I have a statement from Ada and Pleshette Johnson. Osqood. I told him, no, I do not have such a statement. I did tell him that we were not able to look at the discovery in the Okose investigation because of Hurricane Ike. It caused flooding to the evidence vault at the Houston DEA Office. They are in the process of sorting out the boxes and they hope to be finished by the end of the month. Once that process is finished, then a review of the files will be done to see if there are any reports that pertain to this investigation, whether or not there are Brady material in that -- in those boxes as well. So, it was a merger of my response to him by Mr. Osgood, but, you know, he's right. Due to a hurricane, the boxes have been disheveled in the evidence box, and they're in the process of sorting them out.

But once they are sorted, then we can review the boxes.

THE COURT: And are you saying -- I'm a little confused.

Are you saying you have or you don't have statements from Ada and Pleshette Johnson?

MR. RHODES: Other than what has already been disclosed to defense counsel, there are no other statements.

THE COURT: But you have disclosed statements of those two --

MR. RHODES: Yes.

THE COURT: -- to defense counsel?

MR. RHODES: Yes. Yes.

THE COURT: But is it possible there could be other statements in these boxes?

MR. RHODES: It's possible and we will look for such statements.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I mean I don't know what I can say, Mr. Osgood, other than it sounds like they're kind of dependent on when they get those boxes reorganized down there.

MR. OSGOOD: From my recollection of doing Mr. Rhodes' job, these reports are routinely sent, a copy to headquarters. So, it's quite easy for them to retrieve any reports written by any DEA agents in this case in Texas by simply going to headquarters and citing the case number and saying give us copies back of the reports that we sent to you at headquarters in

Washington, so.

THE COURT: Have you done that, Mr. Rhodes?

MR. RHODES: No, Your Honor. This was a division office. This is one of their main offices where evidence is kept in that region. There is no such -- he is probably quoting a practice from when he was a federal prosecutor and --

MR. OSGOOD: I --

MR. RHODES: -- he just carried it over.

THE COURT: All right. Are you saying that when a DEA or FBI agent goes out and interviews someone in a case, they don't send a copy of their report to Washington?

MR. RHODES: Yeah, I can't answer that definitively.

What I was told was that is the main division office and as a division office, that's where the evidence is kept. As far as is there another --

THE COURT: Well, let me -- let me just ask this. When you have agents go out and prepare reports in cases, you know, where do they send those reports?

MR. RHODES: Well, they just -- they have them inside the computer. Some of the reports they retain in the computer, but what you're talking about are physical files that are being pulled as well, information, but we don't have access to the information. We will gain access to that information --

THE COURT: No, that wasn't my question. My question is, I take it in this case, in the case that's pending before the

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Court, you've had agents that have gone out and done interviews
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   and made reports?
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            MR. RHODES:
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            THE COURT: And they give you a copy of that report?
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            MR. RHODES: Yes.
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            THE COURT: And they keep a copy?
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            MR. RHODES: Yes.
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            THE COURT: And do they send a copy to somebody else?
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            MR. RHODES: They send one to their supervisor, but all
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   the parties on that list of the protocol is I'd have no knowledge
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   of that.
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            THE COURT: Well, all I'm suggesting is because we're
   trying to, you know, move this case along --
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            MR. OSGOOD: Distribution, Your Honor. They go right on
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              That's one of the ones from Texas.
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            THE COURT: And what are you referencing that says it
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   goes to Washington?
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            MR. OSGOOD: Distribution, Your Honor.
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            THE COURT: And it says S-A-R-I.
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            MR. OSGOOD: Special Agent Regional Investigation, I
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   believe is what that stands for.
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            THE COURT: All right. Then it says D-I-G.
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            MR. OSGOOD:
                          That I'm not sure.
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            THE COURT: And then O-E-P.
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            MR. OSGOOD: I just know from years of doing this job
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that everything that the field agents generate, a copy goes to Washington, unless they've changed it. I worked here 25 years and I know that to be a fact, that they can take that number and retrieve these reports from Washington.

THE COURT: Well, the reason, you know, if you've agreed to look through some reports and determine if there's either Brady or other relevant evidence to produce, we have no control over how long it's going to take them to reassemble documents that were in a flooded vault. And if there is a way to simply get these reports from Washington by giving them the case number, then it would seem to me you need to do that and not wait on Texas, because what I don't want to have happen is that this trial be delayed because, you know, there's relevant evidence out there, albeit from another investigation, that hasn't been produced because of circumstances, you know, beyond our control here.

MR. RHODES: We'll look into that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So, how long do you want -- do you want to report back to the Court in writing? Do you want to report back to the Court in a further telephone conference? But I want to follow up in terms of is it necessary to wait for the Houston office to reassemble their files, or is there a way for you to get pertinent information by providing the case number to Washington, D.C.?

MR. RHODES: Writing will suffice, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, what?

MR. RHODES: Writing. By writing -- by way of writing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And how long do you need to file something?

MR. RHODES: I would say five days, Your Honor, to begin the phone calls.

THE COURT: All right. Then let's do this. Today is the 21st. You need to file something by the 28th advising the court and opposing counsel whether you're able to get any of the information from this other related ongoing investigation through Washington, D.C. And when you see the written response, Mr. Osgood, if you're not satisfied, you can contact JoRita and we'll have either a phone conference or an in-person meeting, depending on what the parties' preference is.

MR. OSGOOD: Very well, Your Honor. The other thing that counsel for Mr. Solomon reminded me of, which I think is pertinent, is we presume that there are electronic copies by filed number and certainly that would be available for initial review by the office in Texas. I don't imagine that the hurricane scattered -- maybe it did, I don't know. Maybe there's electronic damage, but that's just another thought. The remaining issue on discovery, and I talked to Mr. Rhodes and he's agreed to do that, is I was operating under the assumption from the very beginning that there are no original scripts in the

possession of the Government. Had there been, I would assume they would have shown those to the handwriting expert and all they showed the handwriting expert, both of them, the one -- the first one and the second one, were Xeroxes. Mr. Rhodes thinks he now has some original scripts. So, I've asked to have the opportunity to actually physically review the evidence at the DEA and he tells me that he will make arrangements for that. I would assume that that should take place fairly soon. I don't want to delay that.

THE COURT: Now, when you say that you want an opportunity to review it, you, not an expert, or I mean the first step is --

MR. OSGOOD: No, just me right now.

THE COURT: All right. Right now.

MR. OSGOOD: Me, right now. I want to see any original scripts they've got. I don't believe there are any. I don't believe they exist.

MR. RHODES: Your Honor, I just want to add that the handwriting expert used original scripts.

THE COURT: Whose handwriting expert?

MR. RHODES: The Government's handwriting expert.

MR. OSGOOD: That's not accurate. The handwriting expert used faxed copies. At one point they went down to Texas with a grand jury subpoena and from an Okose -- or Osco Drug, I believe it was Osco Drug, obtained five or six original scripts

written by Dr. Elder in Texas which patients got filled in Texas. Those are the only original scripts that have been mentioned, produced, or shown in this case. The handwriting expert worked off of faxes, to my knowledge, because that's why he said I can only give a probable because I don't have the originals. was the first guy. Then they showed more Xeroxed copies, or faxed copies, to the second handwriting expert and he said highly probable, but wouldn't give a definitive opinion because he didn't have originals. So, I don't know where Mr. Rhodes is getting the fact -- this idea that they were using originals. The only originals they had were the ones they subpoenaed in Texas later to show -- to compare to some of the scripts they had up there. I don't care about those originals. I want to know if they had questioned originals that they seized at The Medicine Shoppe in Belton. That's the issue. Questioned originals here in Kansas City. They don't exist as far as we know.

THE COURT: Are you saying you have originals from The Medicine Shoppe in Belton?

MR. RHODES: Yes, Your Honor. I'm saying, yes. Yes.

MR. OSGOOD: I want to see them.

MR. RHODES: You know, --

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THE COURT: All right. And that's what you've just recently discovered?

MR. RHODES: No, I've always stated that there were original scripts and it was always in the reports.

1 MR. OSGOOD: It's --

MR. RHODES: There are some original scripts. I don't know why he keeps trying to -- he is doing a cursory review of some of these pleadings and just making assumptions, like he did in the telephone conversation.

MR. OSGOOD: I guess if they had originals they would have shown them to the handwriting expert here and they didn't do that.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you that, Mr. Rhodes.

MR. RHODES: Yes.

THE COURT: I mean, although this is all kind of irrelevant to I mean if you've got them, they'll produce them for you, Mr. Osgood. Did your handwriting experts use originals?

MR. RHODES: Yes. He used some originals and some faxed

copies.

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THE COURT: All right. Well, the report will be clear as to what happened. But in any event, it sounds like there's really no discovery issue. You're going to be provided an opportunity to review these scripts, is that correct, Mr. Osgood?

MR. OSGOOD: Yes.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. OSGOOD: That's all I want.

THE COURT: Okay. Any other issues that we need to address?

MR. BOHLING: I have two matters, Your Honor. One is

just a status issue. One of our discovery questions was, as the Court may recall, there was a -- there was an imaged copy of the Southwest Texas Center hard drive at the DEA forensic lab in Virginia.

THE COURT: Yes.

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I have obtained a search warrant, a new MR. BOHLING: search warrant, specifically for that imaged copy. The DEA is in the process of doing that re-examination for us. I am assured by counsel for DEA that that will be done quickly. I have a call into her today to get us an update on the status, which I will share with defense counsel. As soon as the return is done on that, it has not been confirmed to me by the AUSA in Virginia that the return has been done on that search warrant, but as soon as that is done, I will share the search warrant and related material with counsel and share the results of the report as soon as I receive that, which should be in the near future. My second point, if there's no questions about that. I believe we have a hearing set this afternoon --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BOHLING: -- on the handwriting identification.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BOHLING: The position that I've taken in our response is that that hearing is unnecessary. It's an imaginative argument by Mr. Osgood certainly, but we would -- I think the central fact here is something we would easily concede,

which is there was not a, I quess what one would call a handwriting lineup shown to the witness. I'm not aware of that ever happening in any case ever. I don't think such a thing exists. It's argued that this is simply an issue of authentication identification for the trial court judge and it's a yes, no, thumbs up, thumbs down. If the lay witness can say -if there's a foundation for the lay witness' ability to recognize someone's handwriting because of their familiarity in a nonlitigation setting, then the evidence ought to be admissible. Τf there is not, then it is not. And I've suggested this in that context really becomes irrelevant. There's no such thing as a show-up or a lineup for handwriting. If a person is not sufficiently familiar with the handwriting, it simply doesn't come in at trial. So, I think the suggestion in this issue is a bit of a red herring. In that sense I think this is only an issue for the trial court. It's a few questions to establish foundation, we do it or we don't. I don't believe there is any predicate for having a pretrial hearing on suggestiveness because we'll concede that, if we can't establish a foundation for the person's familiarity with the handwriting, it doesn't come in. There's simply -- it's not a question of being able to say, well, the person saw the handwriting once and, therefore, they would have a chance to identify this in the same way you would identify a person. It doesn't work that way.

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MR. OSGOOD: The Court has an obligation as the

gatekeeper to make two determinations. First, is it admissible, and, second, is it relevant. On admissibility, the Court can determine on any piece of evidence that it doesn't go to weight, it goes to due process considerations. I'll agree that I couldn't find any Eighth Circuit cases on this and I agree that this is a somewhat novel proposition, but there is nothing to say that the Court, as gatekeeper, cannot determine that there was a due process violation that rises to the level such that the evidence should be excluded and it doesn't come in and is not judged on weight. It's just excluded because of due process If you take counsel's argument to it's logical extreme, indigent defendants wouldn't have the right to counsel because some lawyer raised a ridiculous argument. There would be no lineup issues in Niles v. Bigger because some lawyer raised a ridiculous point. I'll admit it's novel, but that doesn't mean that it isn't a legitimate issue and I raised it in good faith and I believe I'll be able to show at the hearing that this woman was herself under investigation. That she was scared to death of That she had been -- she and her husband had been fined the DEA. \$75,000 by the DEA for their own violations, and that they leaned on her and that she is the one that I filed the motion on also to dismiss on the grounds that she lied to Mr. Reeder, and Mr. Reeder will be here this afternoon to testify on credibility grounds and so there is all kinds of indications here that there were serious due process violations in that portion of this

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investigation, and that's what I want to explore at the hearing and I think that it rises to the level such that the Court can say it's not a question of weight, it's a question of due process.

MR. BOHLING: Your Honor, Mr. Osgood has completely changed his argument. His motion was about suggestiveness and he didn't say one word about suggestiveness in his argument to the Court. His arguments are simply impeachment.

THE COURT: Well, I think he's saying, I assume, it says so suggestive, it leads to a due process violation.

MR. OSGOOD: Exactly. That's what Niles v. Bigger says.

MR. BOHLING: But that's --- we have to set the foundation that it's not possibly suggestive or it doesn't come in under 901. If we don't do that at trial, it's simply an authentication issue. I would concede that if there's any question about this lay witness' ability to recognize the handwriting based on her own familiarity with it, that it doesn't come in. I would never say that if there was a question of suggestiveness that it could come in. I'm conceding there was no lineup. There's nothing to litigate about. When we litigate about suggestiveness, we're litigating about the suggestiveness of a lineup, a photo lineup, a live lineup, and whether that was suggestive. There's nothing to litigate about here. I concede. We did not show this person a lineup. We have never in the history of the world as far as I know shown anybody a lineup of

handwriting. It simply doesn't happen and that's because it's a completely different issue. It has no -- it does not translate across from the law of identification of persons by identification of handwriting. We must show at trial that she has a substantial foundation for being able to recognize this handwriting based on her familiarity with it for purposes not for litigation. If we don't meet that burden, it does come in and the trial court decides that. It's not something that would be decided before we get to trial. It's a trial judge -- it's quite simply an evidence issue for the trial court. Okay.

THE COURT: Well, a lot of the things that -
MR. BOHLING: There's simply nothing to litigate about
at this point.

THE COURT: Well, a lot of the things that we have hearings on are ultimately evidence decisions for the trial court and there's always a fine line, but the whole issue is that to the extent evidence is going to be necessary, you know, the trial judges prefer that we at least have the initial hearing. They'll certainly have an opportunity to read the transcript and make the ultimate call as opposed to, you know, taking a half day break to litigate issues. We'll look at the briefing again between now and 1:30.

MR. BOHLING: Okay.

THE COURT: But it's our position that we need to go forward at 1:30.

MR. BOHLING: I guess my bottom line point would be there's nothing -- there's no subject to this hearing. We did not show her a lineup so there's nothing that can be litigated to be suggestive or not suggestive.

THE COURT: Well, I think there could be many ways in which something could be suggestive even without there being a lineup. So, you know, as I said, we'll go back and take a look at the cases that you all have cited, but, you know, I didn't understand, you know, coming into this hearing today, you know, certainly you raised issues about would you be ready to go forward with the suppression hearing and you indicated, no, you wanted the standing issue ruled first. But there was no suggestion that going forward on the handwriting issue was going to be in any way difficult for either side. I mean --

MR. BOHLING: No, I'm not saying that, but we did raise the issue in our pleading that no hearing was necessary and I still believe that to be true. There's nothing to litigate about. There was not a lineup. So, there's nothing to say that it was suggested.

THE COURT: Well, what --

MR. BOHLING: That's what we litigate about and suggestiveness --

THE COURT: Let's go to what witnesses do the parties intend to call this afternoon at 1:30?

MR. BOHLING: Only my agent. Or the --

THE COURT: To talk about the circumstances under which 1 2 the handwriting exemplar was obtained -- or handwriting 3 identification was made? MR. BOHLING: Well, the handwriting identification won't 4 be made until we get to trial, that's what we're talking about. 5 6 We have to show at trial that she can do that in the court. 7 THE COURT: What is it that you intend to show today is 8 my question? 9 10 11

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MR. BOHLING: I'm not sure because I'm not sure what we're litigating about. There's no lineup. There's nothing to suppress. It's the inquiry identification of the handwriting that Rule 901 deals with. So, I don't quite understand the motion, that's my problem. There's no --

THE COURT: Well, I wish you'd indicated, you know, before we have this set today.

MR. BOHLING: I did, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Certainly I didn't --

MR. BOHLING: It's right here. I indicated no hearing.

THE COURT: I understand that, but we had a whole discussion about what were the parties ready to go forward on hearings today and what did they need further argument on, and both sides agreed we needed to address standing and both sides agreed we'd be ready to go with the hearing on the --

MR. BOHLING: But that's a different issue --

25 THE COURT: -- motion with respect to the handwriting. MR. BOHLING: -- conceptually. Being ready to go does not mean we need to have a hearing.

MR. OSGOOD: Your Honor, --

MR. BOHLING: We're ready to go, but we don't need to have the hearing.

THE COURT: Well, I was setting a hearing. I don't know
-- and I was trying to find out from the parties what matters
they wanted to have a hearing on and what matters they wanted to
have further argument on.

MR. BOHLING: I know, but there's no reason to have a hearing. Legally there's nothing to have a hearing about.

MR. OSGOOD: Your Honor, this is -- he keeps analogizing it to a lineup, and I'll take that and run with it. At a lineup when the police conduct a lineup, and even if counsel is there present at the lineup, if the policeman is over there grabbing the witness and saying take a hard look at Number 3. You passed Number 3. Go back and look at Number 3 again. Don't you notice the way that Number 3 is holding their head and the way that they're looking. Clearly, you can have a violation, a due process violation, and make it overly suggestive by the facts. That's what we want to explore. I talked to counsel about this and I said he said he was not bringing Ms. Hearn up and I said I could live with that, as long as we have the agent here and I said Mr. Reeder will be here. So, I think the issue is clearly joined.

1 THE COURT: All right. And it sounds like we've got 2 then the people that we're going to need --3 MR. BOHLING: Right. THE COURT: -- for purposes of the --4 5 MR. BOHLING: For the hearing. THE COURT: -- defendants' motion. 6 7 MR. BOHLING: But just to be clear, we are not trying to 8 put in an out-of-court identification which is what all these cases talk about. This is an in-trial court identification where 10 we have to make the 901 showing for the trial court judge. 11 there's no subject for this litigation. 12 THE COURT: All right. We'll see everybody back at 13 1:30, or those that are interested in the 1:30 proceeding. 14 right. We will be in recess. 15 MR. OSGOOD: Thank you, Your Honor. 16 (Court Adjourned at 10:30 a.m.) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

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from the electronic sound recording of the proceeding in the above-entitled matter.

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript

<u>/s/ Lissa C. Whittaker</u> Signature of transcriber October 27, 2008
Date

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